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IN THE SUP.REME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CECELIA WILSON and
CLARA :MARTIN,
Plaint,iffs and Respondents,

)

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 9567

I

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEl\IENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court
below. All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents deem it necessary to restate the facts
for the reasons that Appellant has not stated the facts
as they must be viewed on appeal, favorable to Respondents, and Appellant has not fully stated the facts.
This case was tried on the sole issue of whether or
not the city was negligent in allo·wing a cracked and
broken manhole cover to be in use at the tin1e and place
in question. The defendant made no claim of contributory negligence, and specifically alleged that the city
had no notice of any defect. (R-11)
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The area in question is a residential area in Salt
Lake City, Utah, in the vic,inity of Sixth South and
13th West. A diagram of the area involved is contained
in Exhibit 5.
In answers to interrogatories which were admitted
into evidence, (Exhibit 10, R-133, 134), the city admitted
that it put a storm sewer in, commencing at Pueblo
Street, running thence east on "\Vasatch, thence north
to Arapahoe Avenue, thence east to Navajo Street, thence
north to Sixth South Street, thence east to Tenth West
Street, terminating in the Jordan River; the work commencing on .July 28, 1960, and being completed on October 13, 1960. The city had a contract with Evan W.
Ashby, Contractor, for the installation of this storm
sewer. Exhibit 5 shows with a wavy line the general
line of the trench work, digging, and so forth, connected
with this project as it ran north on Navajo and east on
Sixth South, near the area in question.
Witnesses produced by plaintiff testified as to the
effect of this work on the streets in question. Mrs. Gwen
Hobbs, who lives across the street from the manhole,
testified that two weeks before the accident, she noticed
''some of these great big trucks that carry gravel and
dirt and top oil, and things like that, and then this
heavy one, I don't know what they call it,'' operating in
the area in question. (R-103, 104) In characterizing the
size of the tractor or grader, she described it as "a big
thing, because my little girls said it looked like a monster." (R-104) Furthermore, she stated that any time
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any one went over the Inanhole cover she could hear
a loud noise, "a clang like when smne one lilts a Inanhole eover." (R-103) The witnesses who lived in tlus
area, including Gwen I-:Iobbs, her daughter Carol, Lois
Casper, and IIarris A. 'Vilson, testified that frorn approximatel~T two weeks prior to the accident, there were
gravel and dirt trucks operating in the area, hauling
gravel and dirt, and traveling on 13th \Vest between
Sixth South and Arapahoe A venue, and a large velucle
with steel treads, which was seen operating on 13th West
between Sixth South and Arapahoe Avenue, which Mr.
Wilson described as a backhoe, a machine which digs
trenches and holes. In addition to this, the bus route had
been changed so that the city bus was traveling over the
area in question, which its regular route did not cover.
(R-86, 95, 96, 103, 104, 120, 121, 122, 123) Carol Hobbs
and Lois Casper, 13V:z and 14¥2 years of age respectively,
testified as to their observations of the manhole cover
in question prior to the accident. They also witnessed
the accident. Carol Hobbs testified that approximately
one week before the accident she noticed that the manhole
cover in question ·was broken 1n three parts.
She testified that there were a large piece and two small
ones, one of which was missing at that time. (R-85)
Lois Casper testified that she had observed the manhole
cover in question a week to a week and half before the
accident, that it was cracked, and that there was a small
piece missing. (R-94, 95) Gwen Hobbs testified that
she had noticed the manhole cover several times before
the accident; that the first occasion when she noticed the
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1nanhole cover was over a week before the accident.
At that time she noti~d that the cover was partially
off and tipped, at which time she and her mother moved
it back on. She stated that after that occasion she noticed
that the manhole cover was breaking, at which time she
noticed there was a piece missing. Also, she noticed
pieces of the cover lying on the road. On cross examination, ~irs. Hobbs stated that she had replaced the lid
twice, once when it was just tipped, and once when it
was broken, stating that it was in three piece·s, a big
piece and two smaller ones.
The remaining piece of the cover, furnished by the
city, was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 6. Photographs, furnished also by the city and taken at the
scene of the accident, were also admitted into evidence
as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 show
the re1naining piece of the cover in the street shortly
after the accident. Exhibit 2 shows the cover substantially as it appeared at the time of trial. It could
easily be noted on this exhibit and the manhole cover
itself that there was a break of the supporting crossarm, which appeared to be a much olde·r break than
the rest of the broken surface on said cover.
Defendant produced witnesses from the Sewer &
Street Departn1ents of Salt Lake City. Mr. Gay Smith
testified that the city mspects manholes of the type
involved in his case once a month, and that the records
showed that this particular manhole had been inspected
on July 13, 1960, and had not been inspected again prior
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to the accident on Augu::;t 20, 1960. (R-146, 147) :Mr.
James D. ~1oser testified that he rnakes inspections of
sanitary sewers which are of the type involved herein,
which includes an inspection of the manhole lid to see
whether it is in good condition; and that it is very easy
to ascertain whether or not a sewer lid is cracked frorn
the sound of the lid when it is allowed to go back in
place. (R-151, 152) All three witnesses readily agreed
upon cross examination that any cracked or broken lids
on manholes were immediately replaced, and that defective manhole covers were dangerous to auton1obiles. Mr.
Moser also admitted that occasionally he finds cracked
and broken lids and that these are immediately replaced.
(R-153)
Under proper instructions from the court, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of both plaintiffs and against
defendant, upon which judgment was duly entered. (R178)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE IS A JURY QUESTION

Since the question to be determined by this appeal
IS whether or not a jury question was raised by the
evidence, the evidence must be reviewed in a light mot:_::t
favorable to plaintiffs.
". . . unless the question of negligence is free
from doubt, the court cannot pass upon it as
a question of law; ... if ... the court is in doubt
whether reasonable men, ... might arrive at dif-
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ferent conclusions, then this very doubt determines the question to he one of fact for the jury
and not or1e of law for the court." Newton v.
O.S.L.R. (1913) 43 U. 219, 134 P. 567, 570.
The general duty of the city in regard to its streets
and sidewalks has been stated in Ray v. Salt Lake City
(1937), 99 U. 412, 69 P.2d 256:
''It is the duty of a municipal corporation,
generally speaking, and as a matter of law, to
use ordinary care and diligence to ke.ep its streets
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for
ordinary usage to which they are subjected.''
In applying this duty to cities, one of the areas which
has occupied much attention from the appellate courts
has been that of notice, and particularly what is tern1ed
constructive notice. Of course, as a general observation,
it appears that each case must depend upon its own
particular fact situation; and generally the question of
whether or not the city has had constructive notice is
one of fact for the jury. It is stated at 66 C.J.S.,
NOTT·CE, §11, at page 642:
''Whatever puts a person on inquiry amounts
in judgment of law to notice, provided the inquiry
becomes a duty and would lead to knowledge of
the facts by the exercise of ordinary intelligence
and understanding."
A more elaborate statement is contained in 1IcQuillin, ~iUNICIP AL CORPORATIONS, 3d Ed., Yol. 19,
§54.109, at page 397 :
"The municipality is chargeable with notice
of such defects as ordinary care and reasonable
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diligence would discover, and the fact that the
defect is open to common observation is constructive notice. Stated in another way, if facts exist
"'ith which ignorance is not compatible, except
on the assumption of failure to exercise reasonable official care, notice will be presumed. However, to charge the muncipality with constructive
notice, it need not be so obvious or notorious as
to be observed by all."
At page 405:
"In determining what length of time will impute notice, regard should be had to the place
where the defect is, whether in a business or residence section, whether in a thickly settled or
sparsely populated district, whether much traveled or suburban; the nature of the defect, whether
patent or latent, one which cannot but be seen
by all passers-by, or one so small as to be noticeable by a fevv only; the apparent danger, whether
very dangerous as apparent to every one, or merely a possible but not probable source of danger,
etc. For example, if one should dig a deep ditch
across a sidewalk and in no way guard the excavation, so that every person would be obliged to
go around the ditch or step over it, the danger
is so great that a very few days' thne would
impute notice to the municipality. So, notice has
been imputed in case of a coalhole open frmn
early in the morning until noon."
In the implementation of the general rules concerning constructive notice, it has been held that a city must
anticipate defects which are the natural and ordinary
result of use and climatic influences; and that a~y situation which would affect the condition of the stree~ts
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by reason of the above would give the city a greater
duty in regard to inspections to discover defects. As is
stated in 25 Am. Jur., I-IIGI-!\¥AYS, § 446, at page 738:
"The duty of the public authority to use
ordinary care in keeping its highways in a safe
condition for public travel involves the anticipation of defects that are the natural and ordinary
result of use and climatic influences, and it may
be charged with constructive notice of their existence by reason of its failure to anticipate them
and its neglect to Inake sufficiently frequent and
careful examinations or inspections to enable it
to discover them. . .. Notice of the occurrence of
an event or the existence of a condition which, in
view of particular conditions, may involve potential danger to travelers, n1ay likewise impose the
duty of inspection."
The case of Fackerell v. San Diego, (Cal. 1945), 26
Cal.2d 196, 157 P.2d 625, involved a situation where
part of an unimproved sidewalk gave way, causing the
plaintiff to fall into the hole. The evidence showed that
the city had constructed this sidewalk approximately
six months prior to the incident in an area where rain
could cause erosion.

The court held that municipal

authorities, planning and constructing an improvement
with kno-wledge of circumstances w·hich reasonably might
be expected to result in a dangerous condition of the
improvement, are required to maim inspections cmnmensurate in scope with the nature and character of their
knowledge and a peril which should be avoided. At page
630 the court stated :
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"The rules governing constructive notice require reasonable diligence in making inspections
for the discovery of unsafe or defective conditions.''
This rule was also applied in the case of Argus V-4
Kiewit, ('lV ash. 1957), 49 'Vash. 853, 307 P .2d 261,
which involved a motorcycle hitting a depression or
trough three to four inches deep between the gravel on
a detour road and the main highway.
Another situation which can accentuate the du(v
of the rnunicipality to inspect is where a municipality
has hired an independent contractor to construct street
improvernents. It is stated at 38 Am.Jur., MUNICIP _._<\..L
COHPORATIONS, § 600, at p. 297 :
"Again, a municipality n1ay be liable for injuries which result from the negligence of an independent contractor where, although the municipality might not be liable for negligent performance
of the work itself, the municipality failed to perform a general duty of supervising the work."
Cases have unifonnly held that a municipality cannot divest itself of responsibility for maintaining safe
streets and sidewalks merely by hiring an independent
contractor to perform work on said streets and sidewalks.
The case of Eaton v. Follet (R. I 1927), 48 R.I. 189,
136 ...<\... 437, involved a situation where an independent
contractor removing trees near a sidewalk, caused a
hole in the sidewalk wben he removed one of the trees.
The evidence as to when the tree had been rernoved
varied from the same day to several days prior to the
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InJury. The court held that the municipality cannot, by
employing. an independent contractor to make street
repairs, escape liability for injury from the negligence
of the ,contractor. Its liability was based on its failure
in leaving the defectjve place unguarded.
This 'gen'eral duty of supervising the ·work of independent contractors when their work may affect the
safety of streets has been upheld in other cases. See
Scott v. City of Erie 7 (Pa. 1929), 297 Pa. 344, 147 A. 68;
Seamons v. Fitts (R.I. 1899), 21 R-. I. 236, 42 A. 863;
Welsh v. St. Louis (Mo. 1880), 73 :1Io. 71, and Lu1ulahl
v. Idaho Falls (Idaho 1956), 78 Idaho 338, 303 P.2d 667.

Three Utah cases have uniformly held that the
question of constructive notice is a question for the jury
under the various fact situations involved. Naylor v.
Salt Lake City (i894), 9 lT. 491, 35 P. 524 involved
an injury to plaintiff caused by a stonepile left on the
city street by an independent contractor, who had a
contract with Salt Lake City to build a crosswalk. The
evidence showed that there was no guard or light" at the
stonepile, although nearby was a large street light. The
evidence showed that the stones had been at the place in
question anywhere from three to twelve days before
the accident. The Suprmne Court affirmed the trial
court, holding that the question of negligence had been
properly submitted to the jury under proper instructions.
In regard to the question of notice., the court stated at
page 496:
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""'-N e are also satisfied that the evidence
shows that the obstruction had been in the street
such a length of time before. the accident as to
justify the presumption that the city had, or
should have had, by the use of reasonable care
and foresight, notice of such obstruction a sufficient length of time before the accident to have
properly guarded or removed the same.''
The case of Scoville v. Salt Lake City (1895), 11
U. 60, 39 P. 481, concerned' an injury on a sidewalk
caused by the freezing of water which came down .a
wastepipe from a building, the water flowing out and
over the sidewalk. There was evidence indicating that
there was ice at the point in question all winter, and
that this ice was accumulating from December to J anuary 7. The court held that notice was properly submitted
to the jury, stating at page 65:
"The question of notice to appellant was one
of fact for the jury to determine, and not a question for the court. Elliott, Roads & S., p. 461;
Dill. Mun. Cor. § 1026. In Wisconsin, where
a defect in a sidewalk existed one day, and in
11assachusetts, where a defect in a highway existed 13 hours, and in Connecticut, a few hours, from
frozen water, it was held that it was for the jury
to determ1ne whether that constituted sufficient
notice. Howe v. City of Lowell, 101 Mass. 99;
Skeel v. City of Appleton, 49 Wis. 125, 5 N.W.
27, Gaylord v. City of New BriJtain, 59 Conn. 398,
20 Atl. 365 ... The question of notice is not alone
determined from the length of time a defect has
existed, but also from the nature and character of
the defect, the extent of the travel, and whether
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it is in a populous or sparsely-settled part of the
city."

Jones v. Ogden City (1907), 32 U. 221, 89 P. 1006,
involved a case where plaintiff's injuries were caused
by running into some iron beams and other building material lef<t in the street at night at a place where a
property owner and his contractor were building a sidewalk. The evidence showed that the work in question
had been in progress for three days, and that the beams
were delivered at 4 :30 P.M. on the day of the accident,
the accident happening at midnight. The defendant,
Ogden City, argued that the,re was no evidence in the
record tending to show that the city had actual notice
of the obstructions, or that they had been on the street
a sufficient length of time to raise a presumption that
the city had notice of their existence and their unguarded,
unlighted condition. The court held that the question
of notice, as well as negligence, were questions o.f fact
for the jury; that the court erred in directing a verdict
for the defendant, stating at page 228:
"The undisputed evidence shows that at the
time of the accident the work of improving the
sidewalk along the street had been in progress
for a considerable length of time. And it furthe-r
appears that the portion of the sidewalk for which
the material in question was being used had been
in course of construction for three days. And it
may he reasonably inferred from the evidence
that during the time the material was piled on
the strHet for use in the construction of the sidewalk it was left at night unguarded and "'-ithout
lights or signals of any kind to warn the travel-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
ing public of its existence. Furthern1ore, the
record shows that the place where the accident
happened is in the very heart or center of the
business district of the city."
There have been numerous cases in other States
which have held the question of constructive notice to
be one for the jury, in comparable fact situations and
in many instances where the facts are much less persuasive than in the case at bar. llfaddern v. City of
San Frandsco (·Cal. 1946), 74 Cal. App. 2d 742, 169 P.2d
425, involved injuries received by plaintiff when the
pavement of a city street collapsed, and his car sank
into the depression. The size of the depression through
which the car had sunk was variously estimated at from
65 to 80 feet long, 10 to 12 feet wide, and 8 to 10 feet
deep. T h e pavement collapsed into this depression
while plaintiff was driving over it. Evidence produced
by plaintiff showed that two witnesses who worked in
the close vicinity of the depression had noticed a crack
in the pavement, lengthwise in the street involved,
approximately 20 to 30 feet long, 4 or 5· days prior
to the collapse. These witnesses stated that the crack
was about 1Jf2 inches wide and that they could look
down into it about 2 feet and see concrete. These witnesses did not notify any one at City Hall of these
observations. Defendant claimed on appeal that there
was no evidence of notice to defendant of the defect,
either actual or constructive. In holding this to be a
jury question, the court stated, at page 432:
'' ... and we believe that under the authorities
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the true rule for an appellate tribunal to follow
is that when reasonable minds may differ regarding the question as to whether defective conditions
have existed for a sufficient length of time under
the particular circumstances of the case, to charge
· a municipality with constructiv~ knowledge therepf, the conclusion of the jury in that regard may
not be interfered with on appeal."
Skaggs v. General Electric Company (Wash. 1958),
52 Wash. 787, 328 P.2d 871, involved personal injuries
incurred when plaintiff tripped and fell over a vehicle
"Stop" signpost, which was bent across the sidewalk on
the main thoroughfare of Richland Village. The evidence showed that at appoximately 9 :00 A. M. on the
day in question an unidentified rnotorist backed his automobile into the signpost in question, bending it down so
that the pipe which supported the sign extended across
the sidewalk at an elevation of 4 to 10 inches. The
incident in question happened shortly before 4:00 P. M.
on the same day, when plaintiff, having his attention
momentarily distracted by the blowing horn of a passing
autOinobile, tripped over the pipe. The court held that,
under the general rule of law, it was proper for the
court to submit the question of constructive notice to
the jury.
Gates v. Cifty of Des Moines (Iowa 1949), 240 Iowa

775, 38 N.W. 2d 96, was a case where the court held the
question of constructive notice to be one for the jury in
a situation involving

an

icy sidewalk in existence for

approximately 4 days.
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JVarrcn v. Oity of Los Angeles, (Cal. 1949), 91
Cal. App. 2d (i78, 205 P.2d 719, involved a slip at a fan-

shaped wet spot approximately 2 feet wide and 3 feet
long, 1nade slippery by grease and water. There was
evidence that for 2 months prior to and at the time of
the accident, there was a hole in the street, approximately 10 inches by 10 inches, and 2 inches deep, containing
water and oil. The wet spot on the sidewalk was caused
by automobiles passing over the hole splashing onto the
sidewalk. The court held that the question of constructive notice was a question of fact for the jury.
Crawford v. City of Wichita (Kansas 1935) 141
Kan. 171, 39 P.2d 911, involved personal injuries received by plaintiff driving an automobile during a rainstornl, nmning into a manhole over which the cover had
been displaced by water escaping from the storm sewer
for approximately 30 minutes. The evidence showed
that at prior times the cover on the particular manhole
had come off during rainstorms and that the city had
replaced it with another cover which was filled in with
asphalt. There was testimony that a man living near the
place had called the Street Department about 3 or 4
months before the injury, informing them that this cover
would come off during a heavy rainstorm. The court held
that under the evidence introduced in the case, the jury
could find that the city had notice of the defect.

See also Kirack v. City of Ettreka (Cal. 1945), 69
Cal. App. 2d 134, 158 P.2d 270; Perry v. C~ty of San
Diego (Cal. 1947), 80 Cal. App.2d 166, 181 P.2d 98;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
Smith v. City of Jefferson (Wis. 1959), 8 Wis.2d 378,
99 N.W. 2d 119; Alb·ers v. Cincinnati (Ohio 19·60), 111
Ohio App. 295, 165 N.E. 2d 456; and Moses v. City of
Natchitoches (La. 1952), Ct. of App., lOth Cir., 58 So. 2d
292, (Topside of wooden footbridge appeared safe, but
underside was badly decayed and easily discoverable.)

It can be seen from the foregoing cases throughout
the country, as well as the Utah cases, that the question
of constructive notice has been held to be a question for
the jury in weaker fact situations than in the case at
bar. Some of the important considerations which have
been persuasive on the courts have been how easily
discoverable the defect is, the amount of traffic, the type
of area involved, and the extent of the danger involved.
In the case at bar, viewing the evidence in a light
rnost favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence shows an
unusual amount of extraheavy use of the street in
question for at least two weeks by trucks hauling gravel
and dirt a n d the large-treaded vehicle variously described by witnesses. In addition to this, the bus route
had even been changed so that city buses would go over
the area in que·stion. The city was well aware of this
unusual activity, inasmuch as the city had hired an
independent contractor to ins.tall a storm sewer in this
area. As has been se·en in the cases cited, a city cannot
divest itself of responsibility for dangerous conditions
caused by independent contractors. In the context of
this unusual activity, resulting in an extra amount of
heavy usage of the streets and manhole covers in the
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area, the jury would be justified in believing from
plaintiff's evidence that the manhole cover in question
was cracked and broken for up to one and a half weeks
before the incident in question; that not only was t!he
cover cracked and broken, but there was a hole in the
cover caused by a s1nall piece being broken out and missing. The manhole cover could be heard to 1nake loud
noises when being passed over by trucks and vehicles ; on
occasions the cover was knocked completely off the manhole and replaced by one of the witnesses. A person inspecting or looking for defects in manhole covers could
easily have discovered the defective manhole cover in
question. Under the cases a greater duty of inspe:ction
is given to cities in areas where there is unusual usage
of the streets, and especially where a large vehicle with
steel treads is being used on streets.
Defendant's own witnesses testified as to the ease
of discovering defects in n1anhole covers merely by the
sound as the cover is allowed to se.ttle back in place.
Defendant's own witnesses claim that the city inspects
such covers as the one in question once a month, although
in the case at bar admit that it had been approximately
a month and a week frmn the last inspection of this particular manhole cover.
The authorities heretofore cited show that a city
cannot sit back and wait for complaints. A city has an
affirmative duty, governed by the various considerations,
to actively inspect and seek out defects and to remedy
them. Under the evidence here adduced, reasonable minds
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could not uniformly say that Salt Lake City should not
have discovered and remedied the defective manhole
cover prior to the incident in question. \Vhether or not
the city should be charged with constructive notice is at
least a jury question and was properly submitted to the
jury in the case at bar. The city had its day .in court
and had its opportunity to submit evidence and argue to
the jury in this case that it should not be charged with
notice of the defective hanhole cover. The jury held
that the city should be charged with such notice, and
accordingly repudiated the city's argument along these
lines. The right of a person to have a jury trial should
be upheld, and the jury verdict and resulting judgment
in the court below should be affirmed.
POINT II
10-7-77 U. C. A. 1953, SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS ACTIONS
FOR STREET OBSTRUCTIONS.

10-7-77 U. C. A., 1953, states as follows:

''TIME FOR PRESENTING~ CONT·ENTS
- CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ACTION Every claim against a city or· incorporated town
for damages or injury, alleged to have been caused
by the defective, unsafe·, dangerous or obstructed
condition of any stre·et, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk,
culvert or bridge of such city or town, or from
the negligence of the city or town authorities in
respect to any such street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall within thirty days
after the happening of such injury or damage be
presented to the board of commissioners or city
council of such city or board of trustees of such
town ... ''
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The foregoing language specifically waives governmental immunity in cases of defective, unsafe, dangerous,
or obstructed condition of any street, due to the negligenee of the city. This appe·ars to be too clear for argument. See Niblock v. Salt Lake City (1941), 100 U. 573,
111 P. 2d 800, and cases cited therein.
The case of Cob.ia v. Roy City) (Utah 1961), cited
by the defendant in its brief has no application to the
case at bar, inasmuch as it had not1hing to do with a
street obstruction but involved damage resulting from
the operation by the city of a sewer..
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that whe!ther or not the
city had constructive notice of the defeetive and dangerour manhole cover is a jury question. Reasonable minds
eould well find that the city is charged with constructive
notice. In keeping with the elements which bear import~
antly in determining this question, the following should
be considered :
1. At least one and one-half weeks of time in which
the manhole cover was broken and cracked and easily
observable by city inspectors.

2. Unusually heavy use of the street where the manhole cover was located, by trucks hauling gravel and dirt,
buses, and a large steel-treaded vehicle for at least two
weeks. This activity was caused by an independent contractor of the city, and the city knew of such activity but
yet made no inspections.
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3. The defective man'hole cover with the cracks and
breaks was easily discoverable, not to mention the fact
that there is shown on the manhole cover a crack which
appears to be much older than the ones of more recent
origin.
4. The defect in the manhole cover caused a situation which was greatly dangerous to persons driving
automobiles in the vicinity, with a probability of serious
injury.
5. The dangerous condition was easily and quickly
repairable-the evidence showed that the only thing necessary to be done is to replace a manhole lid with a new
one, which could be done easily and quickly.
Under the facts and the law applicable to this case,
it appears obvious that the question of constructive
notice was properly submitted to the jury. It is also obvious in view of the specific language of 10-7-77 U.C.A.,
1953, that cities are liable for injuries and damages
caused by defective, unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed
streets.
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
JOHN L. BLA·CK
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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